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Foreword to the first issue of the WMU Papers on Maritime and Ocean Affairs
World Maritime University (WMU) was founded almost 35 years ago in an effort of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to establish an institution for further education of future maritime and ocean
leaders as well as a centre of excellence in research dedicated to maritime and ocean matters. A major task
for WMU has been capacity building, primarily for developing countries. However, we have also seen a
growing interest in sharing maritime and ocean-related knowledge and experience for developed countries.
This is the reason for WMU’s academic Journal and Book Series, which is a means to facilitate discussions
on contemporary issues in the maritime and ocean-related fields. At the same time, we have taken
cognizance, during the many missions that WMU has carried out over the years, of the need for practical
guidance and the sharing good practice among IMO member States. This experience gave birth to the idea
of a technical paper series.
I am delighted to present the first paper in this new series about the TRACEr methodology adapted in the
maritime context. This is a guidebook for interested parties involved in maritime accident investigations
and technical risk assessments who may be interested in making use of this methodology. With this
guidebook, we have tried to facilitate the work of our parent organization, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and support the considerable efforts it has made and continues to make to raise the
profile of accident investigation as a core responsibility for member States. This would also help to improve
the outcome of such investigations for the benefit of the wider maritime and ocean community at large.
By making the new paper series of WMU available in electronic format that can be downloaded free of
charge and easily distributed, we hope to facilitate the efforts of IMO in areas related to technical
cooperation. At the same time, it is intended to be a small contribution from WMU in support of the UN
Sustainability Goals 4 and 14, by promoting life-long learning, increased maritime safety and contribute to
the sustainability of life below water.
I hope the new paper series is well received by our global community of stakeholders and look forward to
many more papers that will address vital maritime and ocean issues.

Dr. Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry
President
World Maritime University
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FOREWORD
Core tasks of maritime administrations relate to the implementation and enforcement of maritime safety
standards on board ships and in shipping companies. In this respect, accidents could be an indicator for
insufficient regulations or ineffective enforcement provisions. Thorough accident investigation is therefore
an important mandate for maritime administrations in order to identify ways to improve the overall safety
performance of the fleet in an International Maritime Organization (IMO) member state.
The Maritime Risk and System Safety (MaRiSa) Group at World Maritime University (WMU) has applied a
number of accident causation models and models used for the analysis of single aspects of system
performance during different studies in recent years. As part of this new WMU series of reports, the MaRiSa
group will introduce some of these models, taxonomies and methodologies to demonstrate the potential
that systematic application of an analytical framework for accident analysis offers for accident
investigation bodies and ultimately increased maritime safety.
This first paper is dedicated to the analytical framework of the Technique for the Retrospective and
predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr). TRACEr was developed with a specific focus on air traffic
control as a retrospective incident analysis technique and as a predictive human error identification tool
(Shorrock & Kirwan 2002). TRACEr focusses on the human-machine interface (HMI) and suggests that
incidents are often triggered by underlying cognitive and psychological processes that affect the
performance of an operator. TRACEr consists of a modular structure comprising eight inter-related
taxonomies. The core of the TRACEr methodology is the operator’s cognitive process and the environment
in which the operator carries out a task. The TRACEr taxonomy could be used to categorise the findings of
the analysis of individual incident and accident reports as well as questionnaires, interviews and other
observations. In order to be used in the maritime context, TRACEr needed to be adapted accordingly. This
adaptation was called TRACEr-Mar and developed and used in the EU financed CyClaDes project.
This guidebook introduces the TRACEr-Mar framework and will aid the practitioner in applying TRACErMar for the retrospective analysis of maritime accidents.
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1. B ACKGROUND TO TRACE R -M AR
Core tasks of maritime administrations relate to the implementation and enforcement of maritime safety
standards on board ships and in shipping companies. In this respect, accidents could be an indicator for
insufficient regulations or ineffective enforcement provisions. Thorough accident investigation is therefore
an important mandate for maritime administrations in order to identify ways to improve the overall safety
performance of the fleet in an International Maritime Organization (IMO) member state.
In its specific guidelines the IMO highlights the safety aspects in accident investigations. This means that
safety investigations carried out by maritime administrations should not have the objective of establishing
individual liability. Instead, such investigations are supposed to identify factors that systematically may
lead to accidents. In order to deliver on this task, a high degree of harmonization in accident investigation
procedures is a pre-requisite. Without guidelines individual investigators may randomly highlight different
factors that culminate in the accident. This could lead to a situation where the results of such investigations
cannot be used for statistics and trend analysis. Therefore, a tool is needed to set a baseline or standard in
investigations that would allow different investigators to focus on similar issues and harmonise the focus
and outcome of these investigations.
Modern socio-technical systems, which witness the co-evolution and interaction of both social and
technical aspects (Geels, 2004), are highly complex, no less in the maritime sector. However, accident
causation models always simplify the reality to a certain extent and may be inadequate for fully
understanding the complexity of maritime socio-technical systems. While many accident causation models
cannot be used for modelling and analysing an entire socio-technical system, they may be able to focus on
single aspects of the overall system performance. This is the reason why, over the years, so many different
accident causation models and models of single aspects in socio-technical systems were developed.
A systematic accident analysis requires a full methodological framework consisting of a model to support
the focus of the investigation, a related data taxonomy, a methodology for the application of the taxonomy
and an outline of the analysis of the findings (Figure 1). This guidebook provides the necessary information
for such a framework, TRACEr-Mar, the Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of
Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) as adapted to the Maritime domain.
The first part of this guidebook sets out the background of TRACEr-Mar and includes a discussion of its
strengths and weaknesses. The second part introduces the methodology for using TRACEr-Mar and
includes comments on the validity and reliability of the method. In the third part, the full taxonomy is
provided, which in combination with the methodology, allows the coding of accidents using TRACEr-Mar.
The guidebook concludes with a commented application example, where an accident was analysed and
relevant events were coded. This example will help an inexperienced user to become more familiar with
the application of the TRACEr-Mar framework.
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Figure 1: Framework for casualty investigation (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2003 on the basis of Hollnagel, 1998)

1.1 W H A T

IS

TRACE R

ABOUT?

In the past, human error has been held accountable for a large percentage of accidents, including in the
maritime domain (Donaldson, 1994). The reduction of human error is a key end goal of human reliability
analysis (HRA) as it enables practitioners to assess and enhance the reliability of human operators by
reducing the likelihood of errors that can occur (Kirwan, 1994). HRA has three main steps: human error
identification (HEI), in which the errors that can occur are identified; human error quantification, in which
the probability/likelihood of the errors is quantified; and human error reduction, in which the likelihood
of the errors is reduced by taking appropriate measures (Kirwan, 1994).
The Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) is a methodology
that facilitates the identification and classification of human errors in relation to human-machine
interaction (HMI). TRACEr is an HEI method and the premise of HEI is that if one has an understanding of
the task and the technology with which it is to be performed (the HMI), one can identify the probable errors
that can occur (Stanton, Salmon, & Rafferty, 2013). TRACEr was primarily developed for air traffic control
(ATC) by Shorrock and Kirwan (2002) as a domain specific tool for HEI. The need for a classification system,
specific to ATC had been identified earlier in a feasibility study (Evans et al., 1998), and TRACEr fulfilled
this vital need. For the developers of TRACEr, error analysis is essential for safety management, and a
meaningful classification of errors is required to detect trends in incidents and to identify the probable
ways a system could fail (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002). Therefore, TRACEr was developed as a
comprehensive technique for error classification specific to ATC.
TRACEr embodies the Janus’ perspective (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002). The Roman deity Janus presides
over beginnings and transitions and is depicted with two faces, looking forward into the future and looking
back at the bygone past. In a similar vein, TRACEr allows for the identification of errors in a predictive as
well as retrospective capacity. For the forward looking predictive application of TRACEr, the reader is
referred to Shorrock and Kirwan (2002). Their paper focuses on the retrospective application of TRACEr
for the purpose of incident analysis to classify operator errors and to identify patterns in incidents that
contribute to error reduction and/or mitigation.
TRACEr was developed iteratively and was based on expert interviews, accident analysis and a review of
HEI literature, among others (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002). TRACEr focuses on HMI and a comprehensive
analysis of errors by operators in accidents. TRACEr adds to the knowledge about errors and their context
and provides empirical evidence to nuance human error. TRACEr focusses on operator-machine interaction
and suggests that incidents are often triggered by cognitive and psychological errors by the operator.
External and internal factors also influence the operator’s performance.
2
WM

WMU Papers in Maritime and Ocean Affairs No.1

TRACEr-Mar – Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors adapted to the Maritime domain

TRACEr consists of a modular structure comprising eight inter-related taxonomies. These taxonomies can
be divided into those that describe the context of the incident, those that describe the cognitive background
of the production of an error and those relating to incident recovery. The context of the error is captured
by the Task Error, Information and Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) taxonomies. Error production is
classified within TRACEr utilising external error modes (EEMs), cognitive framework, internal error modes
(IEMs), psychological error mechanisms (PEMs) and error detection and correction (Shorrock and Kirwan,
2002). These taxonomies are discussed in-depth in chapter 3.

1.2 C O G N IT IV E

M O D E L S U N D E R L Y IN G

TRACE R

A model or framework to support and inform accurate error classification with the help of a taxonomy is
extremely important (Figure 1). Shorrock and Kirwan (2002) considered several cognitive frameworks and
models of task performance and human error in the development of TRACEr. The simple model of cognition
(SMoC) by Hollnagel (1998) (Figure 2) and Wickens’ (as cited by Liebl et al., 2011) framework (Figure 3)
were found to be the most suitable for developing the cognitive framework for TRACEr.
SMoC emphasises the cyclical nature of cognition (Figure 2). Wickens’ framework (Figure 3) shows that the
stimulus need not necessarily start the information flow and that the working memory can internally
trigger operator decisions and/or responses. Furthermore, the flow of information need not necessarily
progress sequentially through the perception, cognition and action stages. Instead, the long-term memory
can directly trigger cognition and (re)action, thereby shortening the flow of information, if required.
Together these two models highlight the internal mental processes that shape cognitive errors and formed
the basis of the cognitive framework which helps to organise IEMs and PEMs in TRACEr (Shorrock and
Kirwan, 2002).

Figure 2: Simple model of cognition (adapted from Hollnagel, 1998)

3
WM

WMU Papers in Maritime and Ocean Affairs No.1

TRACEr-Mar – Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors adapted to the Maritime domain

Figure 3: Approach to information processing (adapted from Wickens as cited by Liebl, et al., 2011)

1.3 T H E TRACE R -MAR

FRAMEWORK

Since TRACEr was originally developed for the application in aviation with a focus on ATC, it could not
directly be applied in the maritime domain and needed to be adapted to the maritime context. The resulting
domain specific application was called TRACEr-Mar. Figure 4 sets out the applied TRACEr framework as
adapted to the maritime domain.
In principle, two types of adaptions were made in TRACEr-Mar (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2016). The first
adaptation relates to bringing the ship-system into the coding structure in order to enable coders to portray
its complex operations, locations and personnel. The second adaptation mainly relates to the production of
the error. Changes made within this aspect were deemed necessary to enrich the outcome of further
analyses.

1.3.1 I N T R O D U C I N G

THE SHIP AS A SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM

The most significant variation to TRACEr was made in relation to the coding of the task errors and to
portraying the social and technical complexity of the vessel. TRACEr-Mar had to consider multiple
operators in various locations involved in different operational tasks. TRACEr-Mar categorizes four
different locations (bridge, deck, engine (control) room and others) and adds contextual information to the
erroneous task (error information). The additional error information relates to the technical equipment
used by an operator (e.g., radar, ECDIS, VHF, etc.) and enhances the focus on HMI. In addition, an option to
specify subtasks to add clarity, where appropriate, is given. This provides a more substantial description of
the task error.

4
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1.3.2 E N H A N C I N G

THE OUTCOME OF FURTHER ANALYSES

In order to support databases and analyses, a table containing fixed information (such as size, dimension,
etc.) and variable information (such as draught, trim, etc.) about the ship under consideration was added.
In addition, a table with a causality level was included. The determination of the causality level (causal,
contributory, compounding, or non-contributory) of a task error should enhance the analytical strength of
TRACEr-Mar.
Another adaptation pertains to the error recovery. A table was added specifying barriers (physical,
functional, symbolic, or incorporeal) that were intended to prevent the task error. The main aim of physical
or material barriers is to protect personnel and the vessel by blocking or mitigating the effects of the task
error (e.g., walls, doors, helmets, etc.). Functional barrier systems (e.g., locks, passwords, distance,
sprinklers, firefighting, etc.), in most cases, only work if they are combined with physical barrier systems.
They only come into operation when a specific condition exists. A symbolic barrier system (e.g., sign,
signals, instructions, procedures, demarcations, etc.) works indirectly through its meaning and hence
requires an act of interpretation by someone. An incorporeal barrier system (e.g., informal guidance, formal
guidance, rules, restrictions, etc.) lacks material form or substance in the situations where it is applied and
instead depends on the user to apply it in order to achieve its purpose.
Although the original TRACEr taxonomy considered error recovery, it did not define a coding structure for
this element of the technique. The barrier concept for error recovery is also intended to add analytical
strength to the technique.

5
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Figure 4: Applied TRACEr framework adapted to the maritime domain (adapted from Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002)
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2. TRACE R -M AR METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides an overview of the TRACEr-Mar application methodology and discusses the issue of
inter-rater reliability. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of
TRACEr-Mar.

2.1 S T E P S F O R T H E
TRACE R -M A R

C O D IN G A N D A N A L Y S IS O F M A R IT IM E A C C ID E N T S W IT H

The TRACEr-Mar application process has three main aspects – data collection, coding with TRACEr-Mar
and data analysis (adapted from Walker et al., 2012).
•

Data collection
- Detailed data should be collected with respect to the incident(s) to be analysed. This can
include investigation reports, video recordings of incident, and interviews with involved
personnel. When more than once incident has to be analysed, databases can be mined and,
if required, data sets can be combined.
Data coding
- General information: Details of the ship (name, IMO number, type, size and age of vessel),
details of incident (where, when, type and severity of incident) and where on the vessel
the error was performed that led to the incident.
- Task error: Who performed the erroneous action? What task was performed wrongly?
- Error information: Which equipment was involved in the error? Which specific task was
performed wrongly? What information concerning the vessel was not taken into account?
- Causality level: Was the operator performance causal, contributory, compounding or noncontributory to the incident?
- External error mode: What was the observable manifestation of the task error?
- Cognitive domain: Was it a perception, memory, and decision-making or action error, or
was the error an intended violation?
- Internal error mode: What specific internal error occurred?
- Psychological error mechanism: Which psychological mechanisms led to the error?
- Performance shaping factor: Which internal and external factors had a negative influence
on operator performance?
- Error recovery: Which barriers were in place that prevented the incident from developing
into a catastrophe/total loss?
- Calculation of inter-rater reliability.
Data analysis
- Frequency counts obtained from the coding can be utilised to analyse data. An overview
of the data analysis of multiple accident cases can be obtained from frequencies and their
distribution.

•

•

Figure 5 depicts the process of coding incidents using TRACEr-Mar. The process commences with filling in
the narrative and generic information of the incident and continues in a cyclical manner until all of the
identified task errors have been classified according to the relevant TRACEr-Mar taxonomies (see Chapter
3 for the detailed TRACEr-Mar taxonomy tables).
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Figure 5: TRACEr-Mar process application (adapted from Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002)
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2.2 TRACE R

A N D IN T E R - R A T E R R E L IA B IL IT Y

TRACEr-Mar, as adapted to maritime operations based on the original TRACEr methodology (Shorrock &
Kirwan, 2002), focuses on error classification and coding of those errors involved in individual accidents.
Although TRACEr has been used for human error (retrospective) analysis and prediction, there is still a
lack of validation procedures that are generally applicable across domains (Walker et al., 2012). The scope
of this guidebook encompasses the application of the taxonomy in the context of maritime accidents.
Further research studies utilising the taxonomy could contribute to its validation in the maritime context.
In order to enhance the TRACEr-Mar framework, some comments about inter-rater reliability should be
given. Inter-rater reliability is a measure of the consistency of the rating/coding in a study. It is applied if
more than one person has been involved in the coding and is a measure to determine the degree to which
the “raters” (i.e., coders) agree to and are consistent in scoring/rating. Differences in rating are the result
of variability among the “raters”; no humans are alike and most ratings rely on a certain degree of
interpretation and therefore subjectivity. This variability should be considered carefully and
counterbalanced in the design phase. The measure of inter-rater reliability provides a score for the
homogeneity of the rating and indicates if a further refinement of scales might be required (Heiman, 2001).
One technique to determine the inter-rater reliability is the application of reliability testing instruments
such as Cohen’s Kappa (Walker et al., 2012), which measures agreement between categorical variables. It
is recommended to consider this method when applying TRACEr-Mar.
As TRACEr-Mar is based on the coding being conducted by “raters”, it is important to ensure that the raters
show consistency across their coding. Several researchers, among others Stanton et al. (2013), point out
that the original TRACEr has been prone to misinterpretations and inconsistencies in its application by
analysts. This was considered during the adaptation of TRACEr to the maritime domain and it is hoped
that issues that have been criticized previously have been dealt with by the adaptation.
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2.3 A D V A N T A G E S

A N D D IS A D V A N T A G E S O F

TRACE R

Advantages and disadvantages of the TRACEr framework are as follows:
Advantages
•

TRACEr is a comprehensive HEI method.

•

It can be used predictively to identify probable errors that may occur in a specific scenario.

•

It can be used retrospectively to classify and analyse errors in incidents.

•

TRACEr was primarily developed for ATC, however due to most of its generic taxonomies, it has
been applied in other domains such as rail transport (Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson,
2009) and now even in the maritime domain (Graziano et al., 2016; Schröder-Hinrichs et al.
2016).

•

Even though it heavily focuses on errors performed by the individual operator, it considers PSFs,
which are system-wide.

•

Can be undertaken with a pen and paper and related taxonomies.

Disadvantages
•

May appear overcomplicated due to its comprehensiveness.

•

Training and application time may be high due to its exhaustive nature.

•

It can be difficult to find data to support TRACEr analyses without access to personnel involved in
the incident.

•

Even though there is encouraging usability data for the method, there is a lack of validation of the
method in the academic literature.

•

Other error classification approaches such as the Systematic Human Error Reduction and
Prediction Approach (SHERPA) could be quicker and simpler to use.

•

Exclusive focus on errors detracts from considering the wider organisational system in detail.

•

As TRACEr was developed for ATC, some of its taxonomies cannot be applied to other domains.

A key strength of TRACEr is that it can help a practitioner to comprehensively identify and classify operator
errors in operator-machine interaction. The fact that it can be used both predictively and retrospectively
enhances its utility. Most of the TRACEr taxonomies are generic in nature, which allow the method to be
seamlessly adapted to other domains. TRACEr considers system-wide PSFs and this adds depth to the
taxonomy, which primarily focuses on human error. TRACEr only requires copies of the pertinent
taxonomies and pen and paper for its application, making it easy to use.
On the flip side, its comprehensiveness may make the method seem overly complicated and it may require
a long training and application time. At times it can be difficult to access involved personnel and obtain data
to support TRACEr analysis. This can be overcome and balanced with comprehensive data collection. The
usability data for the method is encouraging; however there is a lack of validation of the methodology,
suggesting that more studies are required to validate the method. A focus on errors does detract from the
wider organisational system, however this can be balanced by addressing PSFs. Some of the TRACEr
taxonomies are specific to ATC so other domains will need to develop their own domain specific taxonomies
(Walker et al., 2012). This was one of the motivations to develop TRACEr-Mar for the maritime domain.
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3. TRACE R -M AR TAXONOMY
The TRACEr-Mar taxonomy has a modular architecture that includes nine coding steps or classification
schemes that can be divided into three main groups which describe (i) the context of the incident, (ii) the
production of the error (operator context) and (iii) the recovery from the incident. The taxonomy includes
the description of the error, the psychological explanation of the error, measures of error recovery as well
as explanations pertaining to performance shaping factors and the causality level of the error. Table 1
provides an overview of the nine inter-related TRACEr steps. In subsequent sections of this chapter, each
of these steps is described in detail.
Table 1: Description of TRACEr-Mar steps
TRACER 1st level

Context of
incident

TRACEr 2nd level

Description

1. Task errors

Describe human error in term of task that was not performed
satisfactorily

2. Error information

Describe the subject matter or the topic of the error, i.e., the
human-machine interface

3. Causality level

Human error is classified as being causal, contributory,
compounding or non-contributory to an accident

4. External error mode

External and observable manifestation of the actual error

5. Cognitive domain

Describe the process within which the error occurs
(perception, memory, decision, or action)

6. IEM

Describe what cognitive function failed or could fail and in
what way

7. PEM

Describe the psychological nature of the IEMs, the cognitive
biases that are known to affect performance

8. PSF

Classify factors that have influenced or could influence
performance, aggravated the occurrence of errors or assisted
error recovery

9. Error recovery

Classify how the driver was recovered and what factors
influenced the recovery of the error

Operator context

Error recovery

Before analysing any data, some general information is required about the vessel involved in the
accident/incident or near-miss to make sure that no event is double-coded (table 2). This information will
also provide insight about what factors correlate with maritime occurrences. This step is conducted prior
to the identification of any task error.
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Table 2: Generic vessel information
IMO vessel
number/call sign

Note the IMO vessel number, when indicated. Otherwise please note the call sign of the
vessel for identification

Name of vessel

Name of the vessel at the time of the occurrence as indicated in the report

Date of occurrence

The date of the occurrence as indicated in the report

Geographical position

Insert the GPS location of the vessel when the incident occurred
Near-miss, on-board injury/fatality, mitigated loss, severe loss, total loss

Severity of
occurrence
Type of occurrence

Fire, explosion, grounding, foundering, stranding, capsized, listed, flooded, collision,
hull, machinery, other

Flag state

The flag state of the vessel at the time of the occurrence (when indicated in the report)

Type of vessel

Tanker, combined carrier, product carrier, gas carrier, chemical carrier, bulk carrier,
Ro-Ro, tween decker, container carrier, reefer, cruise ship, ferry

Deadweight or GRT

The deadweight or GRT of the vessel as indicated in the report

Age of vessel

The age of the vessel at the time of occurrence, in years, should be noted

Station on the vessel

The location on the vessel where the incident was triggered should be identified

3.1 C O N T E X T

O F T H E IN C ID E N T

As shown in Table 1, the Context of the Incident comprise three level of information. In the first level, the
Task Error, the context of the error is analysed; In the second level, the coder or analyst shall identify what
equipment was involved at the time of the error, if any; In the third and last level, the causality level is
determined. The three levels are described in more details in the following sections.

3.1.1 T A S K

ERROR

The first step of TRACEr-Mar tries to capture the context of the error. During the performance of which
task did the error occur? To capture the context of the accident/incident, a narrative should be drafted and
a chronological order of the events should be developed by the coder. The text of the conclusion of the
report can be very useful for the narrative and summarize what happened. During this step, it is thus
relevant to identify the location where (e.g., bridge, deck, engine control room) the task was performed and
who performed it (e.g., captain, pilot, first officer, bosun, able bodied seaman AB) (table 3). The task error
is therefore chosen according to the identified location and for each one a list of possible tasks and subtasks
is available for codification. It is important to bear in mind that the taxonomy architecture was designed
such that for each task error only one location, one operator and one user material (technical equipment)
should be entered in the system. For example, if the operator makes an error that involves two piece of
equipment (e.g., Radar and AIS), two task errors must be created. Once a task error has been identified, the
coder shall choose from a list the subtask associated with the particular task error. This increased
granularity is particularly relevant when it associates the task error with the technical equipment involved
and for in-depth statistical analyses. Part of the taxonomy has been adapted following the suggestions made
by Graziano, Teixeira, and Guedes Soares (2016).
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Table 3: Operator
Operator performing the task error
Bridge

Indicate the operator (master, chief officer, second officer, helmsman,
deck cadet officer, etc.)

Deck

Indicate the operator (bosun, AB, oiler, etc.)

Engine (Control) Room

Indicate the operator (chief engineer, second engineer, third engineer,
etc.)

Other

Please indicate in writing

Tables 4, 5 and 6 outline the task errors created for each location on board: bridge, deck and engine
(control) room. After having identified the operator and the location, the coder must identify the nature of
the task the operator was performing at the time the error occurred.
Table 4: Task errors attributed to location bridge
Bridge
Internal
communication

Communication between crew members both on the bridge or between the bridge and
the engine control room or the bridge and the deck

External
communication

Communication between a crew member and a third party on another vessel or ashore

Hand-over/takeover

Some relevant information was not passed on during the hand-over process. This
information was crucial and led to or contributed to the accident

Safety drills

The safety drills were not performed according to the regulations. This led to a situation
where an emergency could not be brought under control

Supervision

Supervision was not performed with care. A mistake was not noticed and led to the
incident. This also involves the control exercised over another crew member tasked to
do a specific job

Navigation

A navigational error occurred and led to an emergency situation (e.g., manoeuvring
errors, course change)

Traffic monitoring
and Watchkeeping

The traffic was not monitored with enough attention; critical information was not
perceived and this led to an incident. Watchkeeping was not conducted with care. Errors
belonging in this category deal with the general control of the surroundings of the vessel
and/or position of the vessel. This category should not be confused with navigation

Voyage planning
including
preparation

An error occurred during voyage planning. The error was not discovered and led to a
risky situation. It is important to specify the equipment, if any, used when the error was
performed

Other tasks

Any other task related to the bridge personnel that was not performed properly and had
serious consequences. Free text category
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Table 5: Task errors attributed to location deck
Deck
Internal
communication

Communication between crew members

External
communication

Communication between a crew member and a third party on another vessel or ashore

Hand-over/takeover

Some relevant information was not passed on during the hand-over process. This
information was crucial and led to or contributed to the accident

Safety drills

The safety drills were not performed according to the regulations. This led to a situation
where an emergency could not be controlled

Supervision

Supervision was not performed with care. A mistake was not noticed and led to an
incident. It also involves the oversight of another crew member tasked to do a specific job

Mooring operations

During mooring operations a mistake was made that had negative consequences

Cargo-work

During cargo-handling work a mistake led to an emergency situation

Maintenance work

During maintenance work an error led to a risky situation

Other tasks

Any other task that was performed by the deck personnel and which was performed
faultily and led to an incident

Table 6: Task errors attributed to location engine (control) room
Engine (Control) Room
Internal
communication

Communication between crew members

Hand-over/takeover

Some relevant information was not passed on during the hand-over process. This
information was crucial and led to or contributed to the accident

Safety drills

The safety drills were not performed according to the regulations. This led to a situation
where an emergency could not be controlled

Supervision

Supervision was not performed with care. A mistake was not noticed and led to the incident.
It also involves the oversight of another crew member tasked to do a specific job

Monitoring of
engine room
control panel

The monitoring of the engine room control panel was not performed with enough care and
this action led to an emergency. It also involves the engine room panel in the cabin of the
engineer on watch during night hours

Maintenance of
equipment

During maintenance work an error led to a risky situation

Other tasks

Any other task that was performed by the engine room personnel and which was performed
faultily and led to an incident

3.1.2 E R R O R

INFORMATION

The category ‘error information’ helps the researcher to look more closely at the context of an accident. It
deals with the equipment involved in the error, denoted as ‘user material’ in the taxonomy (e.g., radar, GPS,
ECDIS, AIS, alarm panels), and which information concerning the vessel, if any, was not taken into account
and represents a contributory factor to the accident (e.g., size and dimension, stability of the vessel,
condition of navigational aids). The coder should be aware that the technical equipment is directly related
to the location and that for each task error identified in tables 4, 5 and 6, a subtask must be chosen; this
additional step gives more granularity to understanding the error.
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3.1.2.1 USER MATERIAL (TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT)
The user material relates to the technical and non-technical equipment that is used on a vessel. It is
separated into the three locations for more detailed analysis (tables 7, 8 and 9). Once the bridge, deck or
engine (control) room has been chosen as the location where the task error happened, the available
technical equipment that was not working properly or from which some information was deducted or
misinterpreted can be identified.
Table 7: User material for location bridge
Bridge
Radar

Information from the radar was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

GPS

Information from the GPS was read out or interpreted wrongly or not taken
into account

BNWAS

The BNWAS was switched off or the alarm was not audible

ECDIS

Information from the ECDIS was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

ECS

Information from the ECS was read out or interpreted wrongly or not taken
into account

AIS

Information from the AIS was read out or interpreted wrongly or not taken
into account

Echo sounder

Information from the echo sounder was read out or interpreted wrongly or
not taken into account

Autopilot

Faulty interaction with the autopilot led to the incident

Steering panel

Faulty interaction with the steering panel led to the incident

External equipment

Faulty interaction with the external equipment led to the incident

Sea chart

Information from the sea chart was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

VHF

Problems with the VHF led to the occurrence of an error

Other communication devices

Problems with the other communication devices led to the occurrence of an
error

Alarm panels

Information from alarm panels was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

Engine room controls

Information from engine room controls was read out or interpreted
wrongly or not taken into account

Checklists & forms

Checklists or forms were not filled out as required leading to an incident

Handbooks

Information from handbooks was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

Decision support system (paper,
electronic)

Faulty interaction with the decision support system led to the incident

Stairs & ladders

An error occurred while the operator was using the stairs or a ladder

Other material

Other material was used when the error occurred

No technical equipment involved

The task error did not involve a human-machine/tool-interface
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Table 8: User material for location deck
Deck
Communication devices

Problems with communication devices led to the occurrence of an error

Monitoring devices

Problems with monitoring devices led to the occurrence of an error

Loading devices (cranes, pumps)

Problems with loading devices led to the occurrence of an error

Mooring equipment

Problems with mooring equipment led to the occurrence of an error

Forms, checklists

Checklists or forms were not filled out as required leading to an incident

Other working tools

Other working tools were in use when the error occurred

Stairs & ladders

An error occurred while the operator was using the stairs or a ladder

Emergency response equipment

Problems with emergency response equipment led to the occurrence of an
error

Other material

Other material was used when the error occurred

No technical equipment involved

The task error did not involve a human-machine/tool-interface

Table 9: User material for location engine (control) room
Engine (Control) Room
Main engine

Problems with the main engine led to the occurrence of an error

Auxiliary engine

Problems with an auxiliary engine led to the occurrence of an error

Engine control room panel

Information from the engine control room panel was read out or interpreted
wrongly or not taken into account

Fuel pumps

Problems with fuel pumps led to the occurrence of an error

Boilers

Problems with boilers led to the occurrence of an error

Turbo chargers

Problems with turbo chargers led to the occurrence of an error

Separators

Problems with separators led to the occurrence of an error

Ballast water pumps

Problems with ballast water pumps led to the occurrence of an error

Communication equipment

Problems with communication equipment led to the occurrence of an error

Forms, checklists

Checklists or forms were not filled out as required leading to an incident

Handbooks

Information from handbooks was read out or interpreted wrongly or not
taken into account

Generators

Problems with generators led to the occurrence of an error

Electricity control panel

Problems with an electricity control panel led to the occurrence of an error

Stairs & ladders

An error occurred while the operator was using the stairs or a ladder

Steering system

Problems with the steering system led to the occurrence of an error

Other material

Other material was used when the error occurred

No technical equipment involved

The task error did not involve a human-machine/tool-interface

16

WMU Papers in Maritime and Ocean Affairs No.1

TRACEr-Mar – Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors adapted to the Maritime domain

3.1.2.2 USER ACTIVITIES
For every task error identified above (tables 4, 5 and 6) a subtask or user activity is added in order give a
better understanding of the activity performed by the operator. For each task error, it is possible to choose
between several subtasks, which are set out in tables 10, 11 and 12 for bridge, deck and engine (control)
room respectively.
Table 10: User activities for location Bridge
Bridge
Internal communication

Communication between bridge officers, between officers and the captain,
between bridge and deck, between bridge and engine room, between bridge
officers and helmsman

External communication

Communication between bridge and pilot, bridge and port employees,
bridge and tug boat

Hand-over/take-over

Hand-over between captain and officers, between officers

Safety drills

Safety drills not performed with care

Supervision

Supervision of deck work, bridge tasks, engine room work

Navigation

Dead reckoning, radar navigation,
manoeuvring, emergency manoeuvring

Traffic monitoring &
watchkeeping

Watchkeeping (maintaining a proper lookout), monitoring equipment
regarding traffic, anchorage, monitoring of sea chart

satellite

navigation,

pilotage,

Table 10 (cont.): User activities for location Bridge
Voyage planning including
preparation

Appraisal, planning, monitoring

Other tasks

Other tasks were performed unsatisfactorily leading to the error. Please
indicate in writing

Table 11: User activities for location deck
Deck
Internal communication

Communication between, e.g., ABs/OSs, between bosun and AB/OS,
between bridge and deck, between deck and engine room

External communication

Communication between deck personnel and pilot, port employees, tug boat

Hand-over/take-over

Hand-over of tasks between AB/OS, between bosun and AB/OS

Safety drills

Safety drills not performed with care

Supervision

Supervision of deck work

Mooring operations

Mooring in harbour, anchoring

Cargo work

In harbour, en route, loading, unloading

Maintenance work

Painting, rust removal, maintenance of machinery, maintenance deck

Other tasks
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Table 12: User activities for location engine (control) room
Engine (Control) Room
Internal communication

Communication between engineers, between AB/OS, between AB/OS and
engineers, between engine room and deck, between bridge and engine room

Hand-over/take-over

Hand-over tasks between engineers, between AB/OS, between engineers
and ABs/OSs

Safety drills

Safety drills not performed with care

Supervision

Supervision of engine room work

Monitoring of engine room
control panel

The engine room control panel was not monitored at all or not monitored
with care so that information was not registered, information was wrongly
interpreted

Maintenance work

Painting, rust removal, maintenance of machinery

Other tasks

Other tasks were performed unsatisfactorily leading to the error. Please
indicate in writing

3.1.2.3 SHIP FIXED INFORMATION
Coding must also capture ship fixed information mentioned in the accident report that was not taken into
account or underestimated as it could be a contributory factor to the incident (table 13).
Table 13: Ship fixed information
Ship fixed information
Size and dimensions

Fixed information about the build of the ship was not taken into account
leading to an incident

Manoeuvring characteristics

Fixed information concerning the reaction of the ship to manoeuvres and its
movement characteristics in water was not taken into account leading to an
incident

Maine engine specifics,
propulsion

Fixed information concerning the performance of a vessel’s machinery was
not taken into account leading to an incident

Stability of the vessel

Information on how stable a ship is in a certain situation and how she reacts
was not taken into account leading to an incident
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3.1.2.4 SHIP VARIABLE INFORMATION
As for ship fixed information, information varies between vessels that must also be considered during
coding as it could be a contributory factor to the incident (table 14).
Table 14: Ship variable information
Ship variable information
Draught, trim, list, current
stability

Specific information for the ship concerning the draught, list, trim or current
stability issues were not taken into account and lead to an incident

Current propulsion, machinery
deficiencies

Specific information concerning the propulsion, machinery deficiencies or
other similar issues were not taken into account and lead to an incident

Condition of navigational aids

Specific information concerning the condition of navigational aids, i.e.,
problems or deficiencies, were not taken into account and lead to an
incident. Error margins or variations in the display of information were not
taken into account

3.1.3 C A U S A L I T Y

LEVEL

To complete the analysis, it is essential to classify the errors by their causality level, i.e., their significance
in contributing to the error. Table 15 sets out four levels of causality.
Table 15: Error causality level
Type

Description

Causal

The operator’s action was the ultimate cause without which the incident
would not have happened

Contributory

An error that contributed to the incident and occurred in addition to the
causal error but the error would probably still have occurred

Compounding

An error that made the situation worse and that occurred after the person
realised that the situation was going to occur

Non-contributory

Other errors that occurred but had no bearing on the situation
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3.2 C O N T E X T

OF THE

OPERATOR

The main strength of the TRACEr-Mar taxonomy is represented by the operator’s cognitive process and the
context in which the operator is operating while performing an erroneous task. The focus on the cognitive
context is in line with the need to analyse the performance variability of an operator where performance
variability is defined as “the way in which individual and collective performances are adjusted to match
current demands and resources, in order to ensure that things go right” (EUROCONTROL, 2009).
Understanding how crew members adjust or not their performance during both expected and unexpected
conditions may help further studies on how to enhance system response. In this regard, TRACEr-Mar
considers additional five steps: the external error mode (EEM); cognitive domain; internal error mode
(IEM); psychological error mechanism (PEM); and performance shaping factor (PSF). The focus at this
point of the coding is to emphasise the error production and to analyse in detail which external and internal
factors may have had an influence on the crew member.

3.2.1 E X T E R N A L E R R O R M O D E
One of the first challenges is the coding of the different error modes (EEM). The EEM, according to Shorrock
and Kirwan (2002), is the external and observable manifestation of an error based on the logical outcome
of an erroneous action in term of timing sequence, selection, quality, etc. EEMs are generally context free
and independent from any cognitive process. EEMs are classified in three main areas: selection and quality,
timing and sequence, and communication (table 16). This category is often used only for error prediction
due to its limited descriptive nature. A full overview is given below.
Table 16: Overview of external error mode
Selection and quality

Timing and Sequence

Communication

Omission

Action too long

Unclear information transmitted

Action too much

Action too short

Unclear information recorded

Action too little

Action too early

Information not sought/obtained

Action in wrong direction

Action too late

Information not transmitted

Wrong action on right object

Action repeated

Information not recorded

Right action on wrong object

Mis-ordering

Incomplete information transmitted

Wrong action on wrong object

Incomplete information recorded

Extraneous act

Incorrect information transmitted
Incorrect information recorded

3.2.2 C O G N I T I V E

DOMAIN

The cognitive domain represent the taxonomy level that potentially applies to the error under
consideration, i.e., perception, memory, decision-making and action. These four categories deal with errors
that are non-intentional. The final category, violation, indicates a voluntary breach of the rules.

20

-

Perception deals with the input of information and the question of whether or not the user received
the necessary information in order to be able to process it.

-

Memory means that the user did perceive the information, but did not deal with the perceived
critical situation or the crucial information in the way the he or she should have due to not
remembering correctly or to not knowing what to do.

-

Decision-making means that the user received the crucial information and processed it correctly,
but came to a wrong conclusion and therefore took a wrong decision.
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-

Action means that the user perceived and processed the information correctly, made a correct
decision, but then made a mistake in the implementation of the action.

-

Violation means an intended violation of rules and regulations that finally led to the incident. This
category is added based on Reasons (1990) model summarizing the principal error types.

The categories IEM and PEM are strictly related to the cognitive domain chosen (table 17). Both represent
a better explanation of the cognitive domain by providing a description of what cognitive function failed,
or could fail, and in what way (Shorrock & Kirwan 2002). IEMs describe the internal taxonomy of the
seafarer’s error within each cognitive domain, i.e., what error did the user commit. PEMs describe the
psychological reason(s) that can be attributed to the occurrence of the error. Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21
describe these taxonomies in detail.
Table 17: List of IEMs and PEMs

Internal Error Mode

Psychology Error Mechanism
Perception

Mishear

Expectation

Mis-see

Confusion

No detection (audio or visual)

Discrimination failure

Late auditory recognition

Tunnel vision

Late detection (visual)

Overloaded

Repeat error

Vigilance

Misread

Distraction/ preoccupation

Visual misperception
Memory
Forget to monitor

Memory confusion

Omitted or late action

Memory overloaded

Forget temporary information

Insufficient familiarisation /learning

Forget store information

Mental block

Mis-recall information or action

Distraction/ preoccupation

Prospective memory failure

Similarity interference

Forget to ask/share information
Decision-making
Mis-projection

Misinterpretation

Poor decision and poor planning

Failure to consider side or long term effects

Late decision or late planning

Mind set

No decision or no planning

Knowledge / competency problem
Decision freeze or overloaded
Risk recognition failure
Action

Information or data entry error
Selection error
Unclear information
Incorrect information
Non – performed action
Timing error
Unclear information recorded
Information not transmit

21

WMU Papers in Maritime and Ocean Affairs No.1

Manual variability
Confusion
Habit intrusion
Distraction/ preoccupation
Other slip
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3.2.2.1 INTERNAL ERROR MODE
After selecting the cognitive domain, the first step is to choose the most likely IEM for the identified
cognitive domain. The single most appropriate IEM should be selected from the identified domains and
recorded. Tables 18 and 19 set out details for each IEM by cognitive domain.
Table 18: IEM: Perception and memory
Perception
Mishear

The signal(s) of technical equipment were not heard accurately

Mis-see

The signal of technical equipment was not seen properly. This aspect
focusses on the ergonomic or physical part of human perception

No detection (audio/visual)

The signal of technical equipment was not seen or heard

Late detection

The signal of technical equipment was only detected when it was too late
to correct the situation

Repeated error

Repeating a mistake leading to a worsening of the situation

Misread

The information from the technical equipment was misread

Visual misperception

The visual signal was inaccurately perceived/ misperceived by the
operator
Memory

Forget to monitor

The operator forgot to monitor the technical equipment

Omitted or late action

The error leading to the accident can be traced back to an operator who
omitted to act or reacted late to a warning signal

Forget temporary information

The error can be traced back to a user who temporarily forgot relevant
information

Forget to store information

The error can be traced back to a failure in storing relevant information

Mis-recall information/action

The user recalls inaccurate information and provides an inaccurate
account of his or her actions post incident

Prospective memory failure

Post-incident failure in recalling the event as it happened

Forget to ask / share information

The operator suffered from a lack of information as he or she forgot to ask
for relevant information/ share relevant information with other crew
members
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Table 19: IEM: Decision-making and action
Decision-making
Mis-projection

Faulty interpretation of information

Poor decision/planning

A wrong decision taken that led to or could not prevent the incident

Late decision/planning

The decision was taken too late to prevent the incident

No decision/planning

No decision was taken to prevent the incident
Action

Information/data entry error

The wrong information was entered into technical equipment

Table 19 (cont.): IEM: Decision-making and action
Selection error

The wrong technical equipment was selected for performing a certain task

Unclear information

The information transferred to another party via technical equipment was
not clear

Incorrect information

The information transferred to another involved party via technical
equipment was not correct

Non-performed action

No action was taken in order to prevent the incident

Timing error

The action taken was not faulty itself, but occurred at the wrong moment

Unclear information recorded

The information that was recorded was not clear

Information not transmitted

Necessary information was not transmitted / transferred to the involved
parties
Violation

Routine violation

On the vessel informal work practises were followed instead of complying
with formal rules. The formal rule was routinely disobeyed

Exceptional violation

The formal rule was not followed only in this one scenario, which led to the
incident

Sabotage

The official rule was not followed with the intention to cause harm
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3.2.2.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL ERROR MECHANISM
After the IEM is identified, the next step is choosing the most likely PEM. The PEM needs to correspond to
the same domain as the IEM (tables 20 and 21). For instance, if the IEM is selected from the memory
domain, then the PEM is also selected from the memory domain. More than one PEM can be selected for
each error. PEMs are fundamental to describing the psychological reason(s) that determine why the error
occurred.
Table 20: PEM: Perception and memory
Perception
Expectation

Information was not perceived properly as the operator was influenced by
an expectation bias, i.e., the operator only perceived the information that
was expected and supported his or her view of the situation

Confusion

The operator confused information with something else

Discrimination failure

The operator received the information, but did not process it as it was
perceived to be irrelevant

Tunnel vision

The operator focused on one single technical equipment or piece of
information, ignoring all the others and not perceiving the relevant
information

Overloaded

The operator was overloaded with other information and therefore did not
perceive the new information

Vigilance

The operator did not perceive the necessary information due to lack of
vigilance

Distraction

The operator was distracted and therefore did not perceive the
information
Memory

Memory confusion

The operator got confused and used the wrong information for the given
situation

Table 20 (cont.): PEM: Perception and memory
Memory overload

The operator’s memory was overloaded as he or she was simultaneously
processing other information

Insufficient familiarisation

The operator was not familiar with the kind of information that should be
processed and therefore erred in processing it

Mental block

Operator could not access the relevant information

Distraction

The operator was processing other information and therefore did not
realize the relevance of the new information and failed to process it

Similarity interference

Due to the similarity of the character of the information the operator
processed the information based on wrong assumptions
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Table 21: PEM: Decision-making and action
Decision-making
Misinterpretation

The data were misinterpreted leading to a wrong decision

Failure to consider side or longterm effects

The operator did not consider the long-term or side effects of the situation

Mind set

The mind set and world view of the operator had an important influence
on decision-making and eventually led to a wrong decision

Knowledge/competency problems

The operator did not have the necessary competency or knowledge to
make the right decision

Decision freeze or overload

The operator was overloaded with information or tasks and was therefore
unable to make a decision

Risk cognition failure

The operator failed to recognize the risk in a given situation or the
decision taken
Action

Manual variability

The risky situation occurred due to a mistake in the manual handling of
technical equipment

Confusion

The operator got confused and used the wrong technical equipment for
the action he or she wanted to perform

Habit intrusion

Out of habit the operator handled the technical equipment in a certain
way. However, this action led to a mistake in the given situation

Distraction/preoccupation

The operator was distracted or preoccupied with something else and
therefore did not perform the necessary action

Other slip

Any other slip that occurred in connection with the handling of technical
equipment
(Intended) Violation

Stress/pressure

Stress and pressure to perform lead to risky actions that consciously
violated existing rules

Fatigue

Body and cognitive fatigue leading to risk taking behaviour/risky
decisions being taken consciously

Intoxication

The operator is intoxicated due to alcohol, drugs or medicine and
consciously makes a risky decision

Lack of knowledge

The operator takes a risk knowing the rules that are being violated, but
not being aware of/not knowing the potential consequences

Emotional condition

The operator is dissatisfied or emotionally unstable leading him or her to
willingly not follow the procedures and rules in place
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3.2.3 P E R F O R M A N C E S H A P I N G F A C T O R S
The final category of the operator context level is the PSF. PSFs help to classify all factors that could have
influenced the performance of the crew member: personal factors, aspects of communication/information,
internal/external environment, organisational factors and other. Tables 22 set out the details of the PSFs.
Table 22: Performance Shaping Factors I
Personal factors
Cognitive fatigue

Cognitive fatigue influenced a person’s performance in an emergency situation

Body fatigue

Body fatigue influenced a person’s performance in an emergency situation

Stress

A person being qualitatively or quantitatively overloaded or under challenged which
influenced his or her performance

Intoxication

A person was intoxicated either by alcohol, drugs, medicine or by engine fumes. This led
to a limitation in their performance

Emotional condition

The person was preoccupied with some personal matters and did not perform at their
usual level
Aspects of communication/information

Ambiguous
information

The information received from technical equipment or other persons was ambiguous
and the person did not know which information to rely on

Lack of information

The person did not have the crucial information at hand to come to a good conclusion in
a certain situation

Wrong information

The received information for decision-making was wrong

Language problems

Misunderstandings occurred due to language barriers

Miscommunication

Miscommunication occurred for various reasons
Training/competence

Lack of experience

The person lacked experience and could not perform to expected standards

Lack of orientation

The person did not have the necessary orientation in a certain situation and this
decreased his or her performance level

Inadequate
training/instruction

The person had inadequate instruction and training on how to react/what to do in a
certain situation and therefore could not perform to the expected standards

No training

The person had no training and could not perform to the expected standards
Internal/external environment

Weather

Weather/climate and related issues had an influence on the operator or the technical
equipment and influenced his/her/its performance

Time of day

Sunshine or darkness influenced the operator’s performance

Atmosphere on the
vessel

The onboard workplace environment influenced the individual behaviour of the
operator leading to worse performance

Business climate

The business operations of the shipping company influenced the performance on board
the vessel, e.g., budget restrictions
Organisational factors

Organisational
culture

The overall organisational culture of the shipping company had an influence on the
performance on the ship (e.g. safety culture)

Organisational
structure

The organisational structure of the shipping company had an influence on the
performance on the ship

Organisational
policies

The organisational policies of the shipping company had an influence on the
performance on the ship
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Table 22: cont.
Operations

The organisational operations of the shipping company had an influence on the
performance on the ship

Procedures

The organisational procedures of the shipping company had an influence on the
performance on the ship

Supervision

A lack of supervision had a negative influence on shipboard operations

Manning/staffing
characteristics

Manning policies, i.e., international crewing, had an influence on the performance of the
individual operators on board the vessel

Time pressure

Pressure to meet a deadline set by the shipping company led to decreased performance by
the operator
Other

Other factors

Any other factor that had a negative influence on the performance of the operator

3.3 E R R O R R E C O V E R Y
Looking at accident models it becomes clear that at some point a barrier should arise to prevent the incident
from happening. If a barrier is efficient and effective, the accident can be prevented and it will cause a nearmiss. If the barriers however do not work properly, an accident will ensue. Hollnagel (2004) differentiates
between physical, functional, symbolic and incorporeal barriers (tables 23, 24, 25 and 26).

3.3.1 P H Y S I C A L

BARRIERS

Physical barriers are passive barriers that fulfil their purpose by themselves (table 23). The aim of physical
or material barriers is to protect by blocking or mitigating the effects of an action.
Table 23: Physical barriers
Physical barrier
Wall, doors, fences, containers…

Prevents penetration of people into unsafe areas

Helmets, safety clothes, gas masks…

Prevents penetration of dangerous material into the human body

Safety glass, fire safe rooms, fire doors…

Prevents penetration of dangerous material into a place/space

3.3.2 F U N C T I O N A L

BARRIERS

Functional barrier systems in most cases only work if they are combined with physical barrier systems
(table 24). These barriers need to be active or ready in order to work. They only start to function when a
specific condition exists.

27

WMU Papers in Maritime and Ocean Affairs No.1

TRACEr-Mar – Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors adapted to the Maritime domain

Table 24: Functional barriers
Functional barrier
Locks, physically interlocking…

Preventing movement or action concerning “hardware”

Passwords, entry codes, action sequences,
pre-conditions…

Preventing movement or action concerning “software”

Distance (too far away for being touched
by mistake), persistence (dead-man
button) …

Hindering or impeding actions in a spatio-temporal sense

Sprinklers, air bags, fire extinguisher…

Dissipating energy, quenching, or extinguishing

3.3.3 S Y M B O L I C

BARRIERS

A symbolic barrier system works indirectly through its meaning and hence requires an act of interpretation
by someone (table 25).
Table 25: Symbolic barriers
Symbolic barrier
Demarcations, labels, warnings…

Countering, preventing or thwarting actions

Instructions, procedures, precautions,
conditions, dialogues

Regulating actions

Signs, signals, warnings, alarms…

Indicating system status or conditions

Clearance, approval…

Communication and interpersonal dependency

3.3.4 I N C O R P O R E A L

BARRIERS

An incorporeal barrier system lacks material form or substance in the situations where it is applied and
instead depends on the user in order to achieve its purpose (table 26).
Table 26: Incorporeal barriers
Incorporeal barrier
Informal guidance: self-restraint, ethical
norms, morals, social or group
pressure…

Complying with or conforming to these rules will help to recover
from an accident

Formal guidance: Rules, restrictions,
laws, guidelines, prohibitions, training…

Complying with or conforming to these rules will help to recover
from an accident
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4. TRACE R -M AR COMMENTED
APPLICATION EXAMPLE
In this section the TRACEr-MAR taxonomy is applied to an accident reported by the Maritime Accident
Investigation Body (MAIB) of the UK. In the summary an overall sequence of the accident is presented. In
section 4.2 a comprehensive list of the identified task errors is given to the reader. However, for the purpose
of this Chapter, the TRACEr-MAR taxonomy is thoroughly applied only to the first two task errors,
respectively in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Tables 28 and 29 condensate the various coding in accordance to the
taxonomy structure. For each code, a reference to the original taxonomy is made on the extreme right
column. A brief explanation of the coding rationale is given.

4.1 S U M M A R Y
At 0308 UTC on 12 December 2012, the dry cargo vessel Beaumont ran aground on Cabo Negro on the
north Spanish coast while on passage from la Coruna to Avilés. At the time of the grounding she was
proceeding at full speed, and the officer of the watch (OOW) was asleep. An inspection of the vessel’s
internal compartment quickly established that, despite being driven hard aground on a rocky ledge, there
was no breach of the hull. The MAIB investigation identified that the OOW had fallen asleep soon after
sending his night lookout off the bridge. Available bridge resources that could have alerted the crew and/or
awoken a sleeping OOW were not used resulting in Beaumont steaming at 11.5 knots with no-one in control
on the bridge for over an hour.
Table 27 : Identified task errors
Report Number

14/2014

Accident Investigation Body

Marine Accident Investigation Body (MAIB)

Date of the accident

12 December 2012

Ship Name

Beaumont

Ship IMO number

9319416

Flag

UK

Ship Type

General cargo

Port of Departure

La Coruna

Port of Arrival

Avilés

Manning

6

Type of accident

Grounding
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4.2 I D E N T IF IE D

TASK ERRORS

Following a thorough analysis of the investigation report, the coder identified seven main tasks error which
are set out in table 27.
Table 28 : Identified task errors
Task Error

Task error description

Who?

Where?

1

The lookout was sent away

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

2

1st Officer fell asleep on the bridge

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

3

ECS volume decreased

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

4

BNWAS switched off

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

5

Radar guard zone absent

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

6

Echo sounder switched off

1st/Chief Officer

Bridge

7

The master did not insist on having a
lookout on the bridge during night
hours

Captain

Bridge
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4.2.1 T A S K E R R O R 1 – T H E

LOOKOUT WAS SENT AWAY BY THE

1ST OFFICER

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, only the first two task errors will be coded following the
TRACEr-Mar taxonomy (tables 28 and 29).
Table 29: Task Error 1
1st Level of
Information

2nd Level of Information

Coding

Reference

Task error

Task error

Supervision

Table 1

Error Information

Subtask

Of bridge tasks

Table 10

User material

No technical equipment involved

Table 7

Ship fixed info

N/A

Table 13

Ship variable info

N/A

Table 14

Causality level

Causality

Contributory

Table 15

Context of the
operator

External error mode

Selection and quality

Table 16

External error mode

Wrong action on right object

Table 16

Cognitive domain

Decision-making

Section 3.2.2

Internal error mode

Poor decision – poor planning

Table 19

Psychological error mechanism

Failure to consider long-term or
side effects

Table 21

Personal factor

Body fatigue

Table 22

Aspects of
communication/information

N/A

Table 22

Training/competence/experience

N/A

Table 22

Internal/external environment

Time of day (dark, light)

Table 23

Organisational factor

N/A

Table 23

Other

N/A

Table 23

Physical barrier not successful

N/A

Table 24

Functional barrier not successful

N/A

Table 25

Symbolic barrier not successful

Instructions, procedures,
precautions, dialogues

Table 26

Incorporeal barrier not successful

Formal guidance, informal
guidance

Table 27

Performance
shaping factor

Error recovery

The action of sending away the lookout from the bridge during night hours was in contrast with
international regulations, however could not be considered a full violation since it was not required by the
company’s safety management system. The coder decided to assign the task error ’supervision’ and the
subtask of ‘bridge tasks’ for this particular action. No user material or ship fixed or variable information
were involved in this particular task error. Following the guidelines in table 16, the EEM coded is ‘selection
and quality’ and specifically ‘wrong action on right object’ since the first officer dealt with the lookout (right
‘object’) but unfortunately decided on an erroneous action (sending him away from the bridge). Taking into
account the internal cognitive process of the first officer, ‘decision-making’ was chosen has the main
cognitive domain for this particular task error because following the guidelines set out in section 3.2.2
above, ‘the user received the crucial information and processed it correctly, but came to a wrong conclusion
and therefore took a wrong decision’. By following this train of thought, the IEM was identified as ‘poor
decision – poor planning’ and the PEM as ‘failure to consider long-term or side effects’. The main PSF
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identified was the time of the day (dark), while error recovery was neither instructions, procedures,
precaution nor dialogues, but and ‘formal Guidance, informal Guidance’ were deemed relevant.

4.2.2 T A S K E R R O R 2 – 1 S T O F F I C E R

FELL ASLEEP ON THE BRIDGE

Table 30: Task error 2
1st Level of
Information

2nd Level of Information

Coding

Reference

Task error

Task error

Traffic monitoring &
watchkeeping

Table 1

Error information

Subtask

Watchkeeping

Table 10

User material

ECS

Table 7

Ship fixed info

N/A

Table 13

Ship variable info

N/A

Table 14

Causality level

Causality

Causal

Table 15

Context of the
operator

External error mode

Selection and quality

Table 16

External error mode

Omission

Table 16

Cognitive domain

Perception

Section 3.2.2

Internal error mode

No detection

Table 18

Psychological error mechanism

Vigilance

Table 20

Personal factor

Body fatigue

Table 22

Aspects of
communication/information

N/A

Table 22

Training/competence/experience

N/A

Table 22

Internal/external environment

Time of day (dark, light)

Table 23

Organisational factor

Manning

Table 23

Other

N/A

Table 23

Physical barrier not successful

N/A

Table 24

Functional barrier not successful

Distance, persistence, dead-man
button, alarms

Table 25

Symbolic barrier not successful

- Instructions, procedures,
precautions, dialogues

Table 26

Performance
shaping factor

Error Recovery

- Signs, signals, warnings, alarms
Incorporeal barrier not successful

Formal guidance, informal
guidance

Table 27

The first officer fell asleep while on watchkeeping duties. In this sense the task error coded is ‘traffic
monitoring & watchkeeping’ and the subtask ‘watchkeeping”. The equipment in use was the electronic
chart system for which the alarm was barely audible. Following the taxonomy, the EEM chosen was
‘omission’ since the operator did not perform any action. Since the ECS alarm was not heard, the cognitive
domain identified was ‘perception’, and the IEM as ‘no detection’ and the PEM as ‘vigilance’. The manning
level and the time of the day (dark) with a very warm environment on the bridge were considered by the
coder the main PSFs. Further, in the error recovery category, neither functional, symbolic nor incorporeal
barriers such as alarms, instructions, warnings, signs, dead-man button, distance, and formal and informal
guidance managed to prevent the accident.
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